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Finally, the event that had been expected so emotionally in Ukraine, the 2002
parliamentary elections, took place on March 31. As a result, only six parties and blocks
out of 33 participants of the election race managed to cross the 4% threshold and receive
seats in the new parliament.
Although official election results will be made public by the Central Election
Commission (CEC) only on April 15, nowadays, after all 100% of the ballots have been
processed, it has been announced that the block of Victor Yushchenko Nasha Ukraina
received 23.56% of the votes, and brought 70 politicians listed in the block’s election list,
to the parliament. The «silver prize» was received by the Communist party of Ukraine
(20% of the votes and 59 seats from the election list), and the block of the «parties of
power» «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» got 11.79% of the votes (35 seats). Other three political
forces that made it to the parliament are the block of Yulia Tymoshenko (7.25% of the
vote or 22 seats), the Socialist party of Ukraine (6.87% of the votes or 20 seats) and the
Socialist Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU(o), 6.27% of the votes or 19 seats
from the party list). All in all, according to the CEC, 25,868,910 voters took part in the
voting (or 69.29% of the eligible voters). 956,248 (3.69%) were judged invalid. The six
blocks and parties that managed to overcome the 4% barrier received together 19,
598,864 votes.
Among the outsiders of the race, the closest to the 4% barrier were the radical left block
of Natalia Vitrenko (3.22%), the «Women for the Future» (2.11%), the Komanda
Ozymoho Pokolinnya (2.02%), the Communist party of Ukraine (Renewed) (1.4%), the
Party of the Green of Ukraine (1.3%), the Yabluko (1.15%), and the Yednist (1.08%).
Other parties failed to receive even 1% of the votes.
The regional distribution of the votes looks rather symptomatic. Nasha Ukraina won in 14
regions of Ukraine: Vinnytsya, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattya, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv,
Lviv, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv and the city
of Kyiv. «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» won in the Donetsk region, and the Socialists won in
Poltava. The second and third best results in the regions were received by the SDPU(o),
the Yulia Tymoshenko block, Yednist in Kyiv and the Russian block in Sevastopol.
The so-called «red belt» of Ukraine, where Communists have traditionally won, shrunk to
«only» right regions, a half of what Nasha Ukraina dominated. In the 1998 parliamentary
elections, the Communists were victorious in 18 regions, and the total proportion of votes
received by them amounted to 24.65%. The third Ukrainian parliament, elected in 1998,
received 125 Communist MPs (84 seats from the party list and 37 winners of the race in
majoritarian constituencies). The results enabled the Communist party to form the largest
faction in the parliament and made it possible for the party to use its numbers to its
benefit.
In the 2002 elections the Communists won in the Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhya, Luhansk,
Mykolayiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Kherson regions, the Crimea and Sevastopol. As the
supporters of the Communist party lived mainly in the eastern and southern parts of
Ukraine, the party’s leader Petro Symonenko made a rather exotic claim that «the
zapadenshchyna (derogatory for «western Ukraine») goes under the influence of
America, the east – under the influence of Russia, the Crimea – under the influence of
Turkey» (Izvestia, April 2, 2002). In his opinion, «this is a new project that is being
implemented by the Ukrainian authorities». The statement, obviously, does not reflect the
situation, as the voting results are based on traditional electorate of the Communists, the
counterpropaganda against Nasha Ukraina and certain myths about national democratic
forces, cultivated in Eastern Ukraine. Interestingly, it may be concluded from the
statement that Symonenko attributes his victory in the east and south of Ukraine and in
the Crimea with alleged dominance of Russia and Turkey and the implementation of
certain scenarios by the power establishment. The alleged division could not be observed
in majoritarian constituencies: for instance, voters of the «red» Zaporizhya region
supported candidates from Nasha Ukraina and «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!».
According to the Central Election Commission, 25,869,106 Ukrainians voted in
majoritarian constituencies. 1,443,549 ballot were judged invalid, and 1,921,239 voted
«against all».
The Communists will not have the majority and will not be the largest faction for the first
time in the history of Ukraine and the CIS. Generally, the elections were won by the
forces that position themselves as centrists, the right and the opposition. Communists
won in only 7 majoritarian constituencies – a small minority compared to the result
received by majoritarian candidates supported by «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» (66 seats). A
substantial number of «non-aligned» candidates are also likely to join the «Za Yedynu
Ukrainu!» block.
According to the preliminary results, the largest factions in the parliament will be formed
by Nasha Ukraina (112 seats) and «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» (101 seats). Communists will
have 66 seats, the SDPU(o) will have 24 seats, the Socialists will have 23 seats, and the
Yulia Tymoshenko block will have 22 seats. Four seats in the parliament were won by
majoritarian candidates from the Democratic Union, three by candidates from Yednist,
and the Party of National Economic Development of Ukraine and the Sea Party got one
seat each.
It is still unclear how the «independent» MPs (i.e., self-nominated and formally not
endorsed by any party or block) will position themselves. According to Yuri Yekhanurov
(deputy chief of staff of Nasha Ukraina), the faction may grow up to 126 MPs, including
those unofficially supported by the block. Head of the presidential administration and
leader of the «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» block Volodymyr Lytvyn is also optimistic: he
claims that the block will receive «at least 125-130 deputy’s mandates» including 82
majoritarian seats, or «more than 100» including those who favors the block (Interfax
Ukraina, April 2, 2002).
Almost all political forces argued there were massive violations of the election process.
The circumstances of the race «signaled out the Ukrainian democracy for four years,»
argued Victor Yushchenko on April 1, stressing that the Nasha Ukraine’s calculations,
based on their own parallel vote counting (PVC), suggested that from 8 to 12% of the
election results were faked. According to the PVC, Nasha Ukraina received 27.07%, and
«Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» received 7.66%. Yushchenko argued that Nasha Ukraina had
become a victim of the so-called «donor scenario», when some proportion of the votes
were stolen from the block and given to the block of the «parties of power». «Facts prove
that the [information about] plans of faking the elections by the staff of «Za Yedynu
Ukrainu!», made public by the ad hoc parliamentary commission» [existed], claimed the
statement of the Socialist party, disseminated on April 1. It was also argued in the
statement that «the state, represented by the Central Election Commission, has failed to
provide technologically for the observance of all procedures, envisaged by the law». The
CEC, many local election commissions became instruments in the hands of violators of
the law, the bodies of political repressions with promising candidates from the
opposition,» – the Socialists’ statement argued. The parallel vote counting was also
organized by the Yulia Tymoshenko block. According to their data, by the time 45% of
the ballots were processed, the block had to receive 9.25% of the votes.
International observers from the OSCE and other international organizations and foreign
bodies also registered a number of irregularities on the polling day. The OSCE had about
400 short-term observers from 45 OSCE member countries in about 1,500 polling
stations, including 45 observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the OCSE, 19
observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and 3 observers
from the European parliament. According to the mission’s preliminary results, the most
serious problems during the elections included violation of confidentiality of voting and
inclusion of non-eligible individuals in the voter lists (registered in 32.65% of the polling
stations visited by the observers). In 6% of the polling stations the observer noticed «poor
performance» of election commission staffs. Members of about 20% of regional election
commissions visited by the mission complained about heavy pressure by local
administrations.
CIS observers, on the contrary, were far less critical of the election process and outcome.
According to first deputy head of the CIS Executive Committee Dmitry Bulakhov, «there
have never been such open and transparent elections in Ukraine» and added that «there
have never been such an avalanche of technical irregularities.» He argued that «the
elections in Ukraine are legitimate, transparent and democratic. We have seen the strife to
achieve democratic standards» (Holos Ukrainy, March 4, 2002). According to the CEC,
the main problems on the polling day were long queues of voters at the polling stations,
the lack of necessary number of voting booths and the badly equipped facilities where the
polling stations were located. As head of the CEC Mykhailo Ryabets argued, some of the
polling stations even did not have electricity.
The election results allow some generalization on various aspects of the race. First, the
voting results suggest that expectations that elections can be won by means of costly
«techniques» alone have failed together with the failure of aggressive PR-based election
projects. The actively promoted Komanda Ozymoho Pokolinnya received only about 2%
of the vote and failed to appeal to liberal values. The proliferation of its advertising
within the two past months of the race caused the opposite reaction in voters. Similar
failure was experienced by Yabluko that based its campaign on massive advertising and
populism, particularly in the regions. Yet, the failure of the «technological» projects
cannot be limited to inadequate choice of the campaign tactics and require deeper
analysis.
Second, Ukrainian voters proved to be rather «conservative» in their political preferences
and chose parties and leaders that declared the presence of political strategies, but not to
seemingly «apolitical» formations that sought to convince voters that «politicians engage
in demagogy» – like the Greens of the «Women for the Future». Generally, the election
campaigns were more heavily focused on leaders than on parties. The example of the
Greens demonstrated again that it is impossible to «enter the same river twice», i.e., to
win the elections with the same strategy and tactics of aggressive TV advertising for the
second time in a row without showing much success in the parliament.
Third, the victory of political parties rather than (non-) political PR-based election
projects showed the readiness of the voters for the change of the power-holders, the crisis
of the state power and its campaign tactics. Notwithstanding the lack of access to the
national media, heavy pressure of the administration and criticism by competitors in their
media, to which the criticized usually did not have a chance to respond, the blocks of
Yulia Tymoshenko and (partly) Victor Yushchenko and the Socialist party of Oleksandr
Moroz managed to receive a large proportion of seats in the new parliament. The votes,
cast for Nasha Ukraina, showed the voters’ attitude to the current holders of the state
power. In a sense, the victory was nourished by the perception of the Yushchenko
government as of a very effective one, seen as productive and efficient alternative to the
present-day government. However, the election victory does not guarantee that the block
will be victorious in the strategic battles for levers of influence within the parliament.
Like a couple of years ago, the words «parliamentary majority» are again among the most
popular in the «political speak». The future development of Ukraine depends to a
substantial extent on the configuration of that formation and on the grounds of its
establishment. Today the situation in the parliament, regarding the formation of the
majority, is difficult and unclear, as the question what entity will serve as the foundation
of the majority - «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» or Nasha Ukraina or both – remains unanswered.
Notwithstanding the claims of members of «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» that their faction will
be the largest in the new parliament, it is still a question whether the entity will transform
into a single whole or will exist as a coalition of its constituent political parties. Members
of Nasha Ukraina do not clearly position themselves in the new parliament and do not
name forces with which they will make alliances. On April 1 Victor Yushchenko
announced that his block would not be in the same formation with the SDPU(o) but that
the block was in process of negotiations about alliances with other political forces.
However, according to Yushchenko, the negotiations will be held only with the forces
that want the Ukrainian state to be independent and its economy transparent and
effective, i.e., with the forces that want to see the Ukrainian power fair. It is difficult for
an outside observer to judge whether, from the perspective of Nasha Ukraina, «Za
Yedynu Ukrainu!» is fair, given the latter’s specific vision of public policy, expressed by
some of its leaders. As far as the SDPU(o) is concerned, the situation that existed before
the elections seems to be repeated. Yet, «Yushchenko said that … on the emotional
attitude to the victory of the NU block [i.e., Nasha Ukraina]. I think when they come to
the parliament there will be more balanced, more reasonable MPs in the block who will
determine whether they should or should not vote, led not by their leader’s ambitions but
by interests of Ukraine,» said one of the leaders of the SDPU(o) Leonid Kravchuk (Den,
April 3, 2002).
Socialists think they may be willing to form a coalition with Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko blocks should such a consolidation be in the latter’s plans. Tymoshenko
also makes a friendship proposal to Yushchenko for forming a democratic oppositional
majority. However, it does not look like Yushchenko is prepared to accept the offer, as he
may not wish to join overt anti-presidential opposition. SDPU(o) promise they will
cooperate in the new parliament with the political forces that «build their work on
something constructive», as Leonid Kravchuk puts it (Interfax Ukraina, April 4, 2002) .
Leader of «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» Volodymyr Lytvyn announced on March 31 that «his
fellow politicians will cooperate in the parliament with the so-called anti-presidential
forces» as, in his view, «those will change their tactics after receiving the deputy
mandates» (Holos Ukrainy, April 2, 2002). According to Lytvyn, those parties and bocks
used anti-presidential slogans only for winning the campaign. However, he never clearly
named the forces he referred to, though his partner in the political block, leader of the
Trudova Ukraina Serhiy Tihipko announced that the majority in the new parliament
should be right-centrist and consist of the «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!», Nasha Ukraina and
SDPU(o). «I am not prepared to be a member of the majority together with the
Communist party and the SDPU(o), he said (Interfax-Ukraina, April 1, 2002). Hence, so
far the attempts to form the majority look like a difficult procedure of constructing a
Lego shape.
However, the final configuration of the majority may be determined by at least two
factors: the choices of independent MPs and positioning of specific political forces in
accordance with their interests – tactical (in the form of specific draft bills) and strategic
alike. In the nearest futures the key issues will include building a coalition government,
election of the leadership of the parliament, the distribution of control over the
parliamentary committees, implementation of the referendum results and the issue of
impeaching President Kuchma. The issues will determine the shape of situational
majorities. But now, while the CEC completes the vote counting procedure, politicians
negotiate with their potential allies and sum up the election results – hopefully in the
interests of the voters, not just in the interest of specific political forces.
